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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-2-2(2)0), 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1 
Did the district court err in determining that the negligence and negligence per se 
claims brought against Gastronomy by the Millers, on behalf of the Estate of Robert 
Miller, are preempted by Utah Code Ann § 32A-14a-101, et seq., the Dramshop Act? 
(Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
("Opp. Mem."), R. 31-33.) 
Standard of Review 
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed on 
appeal for correctness. Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT 103, \A, 57 P.3d 1079. 
Because a judgment on the pleadings involves questions of law, the appellate court 
reviews it for correctness. Houghton v. Department of Health, 2002 UT 101, }^2, 57 P.3d 
1067. 
Issue No. 2 
Did the district court err in determining that the negligence and negligence per se 
claims brought against Gastronomy by the Millers, on behalf of the Estate of Robert 
Miller, are not recognized at common law? (Opp. Mem., R. 33-34.) 
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Standard of Review 
Whether a trial court correctly interpreted a prior judicial opinion is a question of 
law that the appellate court reviews for correctness. Jensen v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 2003 UT 
51, J^56, 82 P.3d 1076. The question of whether a duty exists in a negligence action is a 
question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 
20, f9, 979 P.2d 317. Because a judgment on the pleadings involves questions of law, 
the appellate court reviews it for correctness. Houghton v. Department of Health, 2002 
UT 101,1J2, 57 P.3d 1067. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-204: 
(1) A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise furnish any alcoholic 
beverage or product to: 
(a) any person who is actually or apparently intoxicated; or 
(b) a person whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage 
knew or should have known from the circumstances was actually or 
apparently intoxicated. 
(2) (a) A person who negligently or recklessly violates Subsection 
(1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) A person who knowingly violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor. 
(3) As used in Subsection (2)(a), "negligently" means with simple 
negligence. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case concerns a patron of Gastronomy, Mr. Miller, who was served nine 
glasses of wine by Gastronomy in the span of only two hours while frequenting two 
establishments owned by Gastronomy that are located next door to one another (and 
connected by a short hallway). Despite the fact that Mr. Miller was intoxicated, 
Gastronomy, in blatant disregard for the law, continued to serve Mr. Miller a steady 
stream of alcohol. Upon leaving the Gastronomy establishments, Mr. Miller got into his 
car to drive to his home in Park City, Utah. On the way up Parley's Canyon, Mr. Miller 
lost control of his vehicle and was killed in a single car accident. 
Course of Proceedings 
On June 13, 2003, Mr. Miller's parents, Allen and Beverly Miller, filed suit 
against Gastronomy on behalf of the Estate of Robert Miller, alleging negligence and 
negligence per se. (Compl., R. 1-7.) In their Complaint, the Millers averred that 
Gastronomy owed Mr. Miller a duty not to serve him alcoholic beverages while 
intoxicated, to monitor his alcoholic beverage consumption and level of intoxication, and 
to not allow him to drive while intoxicated. (Compl. H21-22, R- 4.) The Millers also 
averred that Gastronomy owed Mr. Miller a duty under the Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Act - which was enacted to protect the safety of the general public, including Mr. Miller 
— not to serve alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons such as Mr. Miller. (Compl. 
1128-29, R. 5.) 
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Gastronomy breached those duties by serving Mr. Miller at least nine alcoholic 
beverages in approximately two hours when Gastronomy knew or should have known 
that Mr. Miller was intoxicated. (Compl. f30, R. 5.) Further, Gastronomy's act of 
serving Mr. Miller nine alcoholic beverages in approximately two hours was done with a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and in disregard of, Mr. Miller's rights. 
(Compl. ^23, R. 4.) As a proximate result of Gastronomy's negligence and violation of 
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Mr. Miller was killed in a single car accident. 
(Compl. 1fl[24, 31, R. 4-5.) Accordingly, the Millers are entitled to an award of damages 
under the Utah Wrongful Death and Survival of Actions Acts, and punitive damages. 
(Compl. ffl[25, 33, R. 5-6.) 
Gastronomy answered, and subsequently filed a Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings. (Answer, R. 13-17; Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, R. 18-19; 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings ("Supp. Mem."), R. 20-25.) The Millers filed an opposition to the 
motion, and Gastronomy filed a reply. (Opp. Mem., R. 28-36, Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Reply Mem."), R. 39-66.) On 
December 22, 2003, Honorable Tyrone E. Medley heard oral argument on the motion. 
(Minutes Oral Argument, R. 70.) Judge Medley subsequently granted Gastronomy's 
motion, and entered a final Order dismissing the action on February 17, 2004. (Minute 
Entry, R. 71-73, Addendum Ex. 1 hereto; Order Granting Motion for a Judgment on the 
Pleadings and the Dismissal ("Final Order"), R. 74-75, Addendum Ex. 2 hereto.) 
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On March 17, 2004, the Millers appealed the district court's Final Order to the 
Utah Supreme Court by filing a Notice of Appeal and a Notice of Filing Cost Bond, and 
submitting a cost bond in the amount of $300.00 to the Third Judicial District Court. 
(Notice of Appeal, R. 76-78; Notice of Filing Cost Bond, R. 79-81). On March 23, 2004, 
the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
(R. 82.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Saturday, August 10, 2002, Robert Miller, age 48, went to dinner at 
Gastronomy's restaurant, the Market Street Grill, in downtown Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(Compl. f6, R. 2.) Mr. Miller ordered dinner at around 3:04 p.m., ate his meal alone, and 
then closed out his check at the Market Street Grill approximately 40 minutes later at 
3:45 p.m. (Compl. T|7, R. 2.) According to the receipt, during the 40 minutes that Mr. 
Miller dined, Gastronomy served Mr. Miller a total of four glasses of wine, or one glass 
of wine every 10 minutes. (Compl. | 8 , R. 3.) 
Mr. Miller walked the short distance from the Market Street Grill next door to the 
Oyster Bar at approximately 3:45 p.m. (Compl. [^9, R. 3.) The Oyster Bar is a private 
club of Gastronomy located directly adjacent to the Market Street Grill, and in the same 
building. (Compl. f^9, R. 3.) Indeed, the Oyster Bar and the Market Street Grill are 
connected by a short hallway. (Supp. Mem., R. 30.) 
At the Oyster Bar, Gastronomy continued to serve Mr. Miller wine, starting at 
about 4:16 p.m. (Compl. f 10, R. 3.) During the next 36 minutes, Gastronomy served 
Mr. Miller a total of four glasses of wine, again at the rate of about one glass every 10 
5 
minutes. (Compl. }^10, R. 3.) Accordingly, in a span of about one hour and 47 minutes, 
between 3:04 p.m. and 4:51 p.m., Gastronomy served Mr. Miller a total of eight glasses 
of wine. (Compl. I l l , R. 3.) 
Then, at approximately 5:00 p.m., only 10 minutes after Gastronomy had closed 
Mr. Miller's liquor tab at the Oyster Bar, Gastronomy served Mr. Miller his ninth and 
final glass of wine. (Compl. [^12, R. 3.) Mr. Miller consumed his final glass of wine that 
Gastronomy served him, and paid for the final glass of wine at 5:18 p.m. (Compl. ^[13, R. 
3.) 
Mr. Miller then got into his automobile, and left Gastronomy's premises. (Compl. 
^[13, R. 3.) During the approximate two hours that Mr. Miller was at Gastronomy's 
establishments (3:04 p.m. to 5:18 p.m.), Gastronomy served Mr. Miller an astounding 
nine glasses of wine even though Mr. Miller was clearly intoxicated. (Compl. f 14, R. 3.) 
Yet, at no time during the two hour span that Mr. Miller was a guest at 
Gastronomy's establishments did Gastronomy ever stop serving Mr. Miller wine. 
(Compl. |155 R. 3.) This despite the fact that Gastronomy knew, or should have known, 
that Mr. Miller was intoxicated. (Compl. ^30, R. 5.) 
Approximately 30 minutes after leaving Gastronomy's premises, Mr. Miller was 
killed in a single car accident in Parley's Canyon. (Compl. <[[16, R. 3.) An autopsy 
performed on Mr. Miller revealed that after being served and consuming nine glasses of 
wine at Gastronomy's establishments in a period of a little over two hours, Mr. Miller 
had a chest blood alcohol level of .20 gm % and a vitreous alcohol level of .22 gm %, 
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nearly three times the legal blood alcohol limit of .08 gm % in Utah for operating a motor 
vehicle. (CompL 1fl7, R. 4.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In bringing this appeal, the Millers do not contend that Mr. Miller was not without 
fault for consuming alcohol. Mr. Miller consumed alcohol voluntarily at Gastronomy's 
establishments to the point of intoxication and then operated a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol. What the Millers do contend, however, is that any fault on the 
part of Mr. Miller in consuming the excessive amount of alcohol that Gastronomy 
provided to him does not, as a matter of law, absolve Gastronomy of its undeniable duty 
to not "sell, offer to sell, or otherwise furnish any alcoholic beverage or product to: (a) 
any person who is actually or apparently intoxicated; or (b) a person whom [Gastronomy] 
knew or should have known from the circumstances was actually or apparently 
intoxicated." Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-204. Gastronomy breached that duty, thereby 
causing damages to Mr. Miller, including his death. The Millers, therefore, simply seek 
an opportunity to present evidence of Gastronomy's negligence, and the damages caused 
thereby, to a jury. 
Obviously, the jury should also be afforded an opportunity to apportion fault 
between Mr. Miller and Gastronomy according to Utah's comparative fault statute. The 
mere fact that Mr. Miller consumed alcohol does not, as the district court seemed to rule, 
bar the Millers' claims for damages. {See Final Order, R. 75.) 
Further, the Millers' claims are not preempted by the Dramshop Act because the 
Act does not concern claims by first party consumers for injuries. Rather, the Act was 
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enacted specifically to create a claim for third parties that did not exist at common law. 
SeeAdkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 2000 UT 14, fl6, 1 P.3d 528. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's Final Order granting 
Gastronomy's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINAL ORDER GRANTING 
GASTRONOMY'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
WAS INCORRECT, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
A. Utah Common Law Recognizes the Millers' Negligence and 
Negligence Per Se Claims Against Gastronomy. 
On at least two occasions, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a consumer 
has a common law cause of action against a liquor provider if that consumer was 
provided alcohol in violation of the Alcohol Beverage Control Act. See Rees v. 
Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978); Yost v. State of Utah, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 
1981). Contrary to the Court's rulings in Rees and Yost, the district court determined that 
the Millers' claims against Gastronomy are not supported by Utah common law. (Final 
Order, R. 75.) In so ruling, the trial court erred. 
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-204, now included as part of the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act, and its predecessor, § 32-7-14, which was enacted prior to the 
Dramshop Act, create a standard of care for dramshops in dispensing alcohol to patrons, 
which standard Gastronomy unquestionably failed to meet, thereby causing Mr. Miller's 
death. In addition, the common law cause of action by an injured consumer against a 
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provider of alcohol for negligence is recognized by other jurisdictions, and there is well-
reasoned, persuasive authority that the same is true in Utah. 
1. The Millers' Negligence Claim. 
a. Rees v. Albertson }s, Inc. 
Prior to the enactment of the Dramshop Act, the Utah Supreme Court recognized 
in Rees that Utah common law allows an alcohol consumer to recover against the 
provider of alcohol on the basis of the dramshop owner's negligence in providing the 
alcohol. Rees, 587 P.2d at 133 (holding Albertson's liable for injuries to a minor to 
whom it provided beer); see also Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167, 1169 
(Utah 1991) ("Prior to the enactment of the Dramshop Act, Utah common law allowed an 
intoxicated minor to recover against the provider of alcohol on the basis of the dramshop 
owner's negligence in providing the alcohol. . . .") While the consumer in Rees was a 
minor, that distinction does not affect the applicability of the Court's reasoning in Rees to 
this case. 
The plaintiff in Rees was a minor who purchased several six-packs of beer from 
Albertson's. After purchasing the beer, Rees proceeded to drive to Bear Lake with three 
friends. During the trip, Rees and the passengers drank the beer, along with liquor 
purchased at another establishment. On the return trip through Logan Canyon, however, 
Rees lost control of his car and hit a tree. Two of the passengers were killed, and the 
third passenger was seriously injured. Id. at 131. 
Rees brought a contribution action against Albertson's for $54,000, which had 
been paid on his behalf in satisfaction of claims that the injured passengers brought 
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against him arising from the car accident. Rees contended that Albertson's unlawfully 
and negligently sold beer to him as a minor, which caused him to become intoxicated and 
was thus a contributing factor to the accident in question. Id. 
Albertson's moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court 
upon reconsideration. Rees appealed, urging that "notwithstanding whatever his own 
negligence and responsibility may be, under our statute which now permits 
contribution by joint tort feasors, the plaintiff is entitled to have a determination made 
as to his claim of [Albertson }s] negligence and responsibility." Id. at 132 (emphasis 
added). Albertson's argued on appeal that even if it knowingly sold beer to Rees, there 
was no causal relationship between Rees' purchase of the beer and his subsequent 
intoxication. Id. 
The Court, however, rejected Albertson's arguments and reversed the trial court's 
summary judgment. Addressing the question of whether Albertson's was negligent in 
selling alcohol to Rees, the Court stated that "[w]hat is necessary to meet the test of 
negligence and proximate cause is that it be reasonably foreseeable, not that the particular 
accident would occur, but only that there is a likelihood of an occurrence of the same 
general nature." Id. at 133 (emphasis added). Because a jury is entitled to base its 
judgment on all reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn therefrom, the Court 
determined that "reasonable minds could believe that in selling beer to a minor, such as 
plaintiff [Albertson Js] reasonably should have foreseen the likelihood of it being 
combined with an automobile and result in some occurrence such as eventuated here." 
Id. at 133 (emphasis added). 
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In making this determination, the Court acknowledged that: 
questions relating to negligence and proximate cause are for a fact-trier, 
court or juryy to determine. A party should not be deprived of the privilege 
of having such an adjudication of his claims unless it appears that even 
upon the facts claimed by him he could not establish a basis for recovery. 
Moreover, when there is doubt about the matter, it should be resolved in 
favor of permitting the party to go to trial. 
Id. (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court expressly found 
that Albertson's was not entitled to summary judgment because reasonable minds could 
believe that in selling beer to a minor in violation of the law, Albertson's should have 
foreseen that it could be combined with a car and result in an accident. Id. As such, the 
Court in Rees recognized a duty on the part of Albertson's owing to Rees even though he 
was also negligent as an underage consumer of alcohol. Id. at 132. 
Indeed, the Court's ruling in Rees, recognizing a common law cause of action by a 
consumer against the provider of alcohol for injuries sustained by the consumer, was 
expressly noted in Horton. Specifically, the Court in Horton indicated that even "[pjrior 
to the enactment of the Dramshop Act, Utah common law allowed an intoxicated 
minor to recover against the provider of alcohol on the basis of the dramshop owner's 
negligence in providing the alcohol. .. ." Horton, 821 P.2d at 1169 (emphasis added). 
The Court ruling in Rees, supporting a common law negligence action by a 
consumer against a provider of alcohol, is also supported by Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-15 
(1953) (repealed in 1985)1, in effect when Rees was decided. Section 32-7-15 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-14 (1953) (repealed in 1985), in effect when Rees and Yost were decided, 
provides that: aNo person shall sell or supply any alcoholic beverages or permit alcoholic beverages to be sold or 
supplied to any person under or apparently under the influence of liquor." This provision was repealed in 1985 
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criminalized the sale of alcohol to a minor. Because that provision provided a minimum 
standard of care for dramshops in dispensing alcohol, it is only logical that the Court in 
Rees presumed that Albertson's owed a duty to the minor plaintiff, establishing the basis 
for a common law cause of action by a minor consumer against a dramshop. 
b. Yost v. State of Utah 
Three years after its decision in Rees, the Utah Supreme Court took the next 
logical step by recognizing that a provider of alcohol may be liable to a consumer of 
alcohol — who is not a minor — under a common law negligence claim, if the provider 
violated a statute making it unlawful to sell alcohol to an intoxicated person. Yost, 640 
P.2datl046n.4. 
In Yost, a minor defendant had purchased alcohol from several establishments 
while traveling from Ogden to Powder Mountain Resort with the plaintiff and two other 
passengers. By the time the group reached Snow Basin, they had consumed five bottles 
of wine and twenty-four cans of beer. They proceeded to Powder Mountain Resort, 
where they all drank more beer. When they left the resort area, the minor defendant 
blacked out, and the truck rolled down an embankment. The plaintiff was thrown from 
the truck and sustained severe injuries. 
The plaintiff brought suit against the minor defendant and three liquor 
establishments who sold alcohol to the minor defendant on the night in question. Prior to 
trial, the defendants filed summary judgment motions, seeking a determination that "there 
can be no cause of action against one who furnishes liquor in favor of those injured by 
along with the entire Liquor Control Act, which was replaced by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. The 
comparable provision to Section 32-7-14 is now found at Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-204, discussed infra. 
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the intoxication of the person so furnished." Id. at 1046 (footnote omitted). The trial 
court refused to adopt a "civil damage" or "dramshop" act by judicial flat, but "denied the 
[defendants'] motions for summary judgment on the basis that the unlawful sale of 
liquor to a minor may be considered in apportioning negligence." Id. (footnote 
omitted; emphasis added). 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court's determination was 
"consistent with the common law, as well as with the recent pronouncement of this Court 
in Rees v. Albertson V Id. (footnotes omitted). The Court explained that in Rees, 
we reversed the summary judgment entered by a lower court and held that 
a minor is entitled to have a determination as to both the misconduct of 
the seller from whom he purchased beer and the foreseeability that such 
sale would result in an injury of the same general nature as that which 
occurred. 
Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court noted, "A comparable situation would be the 
unlawful sale of liquor to a drunken person? Id. at 1046 n.4 (citation omitted; 
emphasis added). 
The Court's decision in Yost recognized the trial court's proper denial of the 
defendants' summary judgment motions, determining that the unlawful sale of alcohol 
can and should be considered in apportioning negligence. Id. By stating that the sale of 
alcohol by a dramshop to a minor or an intoxicated person may be considered in 
apportioning negligence, the Utah Supreme Court in Yost effectively recognized that a 
dramshop owes a duty to minors and intoxicated persons not to serve them alcohol. 
Indeed, if there was no duty, there would be no reason to apportion fault to the dramshop. 
See, e.g., Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993) (if a defendant lacks 
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fault as a matter of law, the defendant is excluded from apportionment of fault under 
Utah's comparative negligence statute). Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court's 
decisions in Rees and Yost recognize a duty on the part of the dramshop to its patrons, 
including intoxicated persons, as well as a common law cause of action by intoxicated 
persons against dramshops for violation of the laws prohibiting the sale of alcohol to 
minors and intoxicated persons. 
Whether Gastronomy owed a duty to Mr. Miller to not serve him alcohol once he 
became intoxicated is a question of law to be determined by the Court. Smith v. 
Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, [^14, 94 P.3d 919. As set forth above, this Court has already 
recognized such a duty in Rees and Yost. The remaining questions relating to negligence 
and proximate cause are for the jury to determine "unless it appears that even upon the 
facts claimed by [the plaintiff] he could not establish a basis for recovery." Rees, 587 
P.2d at 133. The Millers have sufficiently alleged the remaining elements of their 
negligence claim against Gastronomy in their Complaint, and since the Court is 
evaluating Gastronomy's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the facts set forth in the 
Millers' Complaint are presumed to be true, with all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom considered in a light most favorable to the Millers. Jensen, 2003 UT 51, f 2. 
In short, because this Court has recognized a common law action for a dramshop's 
violation of its duty owed to an intoxicated patron to not serve that patron alcohol, and 
because the Millers have sufficiently plead the remaining elements of their negligence 
claim against Gastronomy, the Millers are entitled to have their claims considered by a 
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jury. Accordingly, the district court's Final Order dismissing the Millers' Complaint 
should be reversed. 
2. The Millers' Negligence Per Se Claim. 
a. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-204 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-204 makes it unlawful for a person to "sell, offer to 
sell, or otherwise furnish any alcoholic beverage or product to: (a) any person who is 
actually or apparently intoxicated; or (b) a person whom the person furnishing the 
alcoholic beverage knew or should have known from the circumstances was actually or 
apparently intoxicated." This provision creates a minimum standard of care for alcohol 
providers, and imposes a duty upon them to act in accordance with that standard. 
Gastronomy's clear failure to meet this minimum standard of care in serving nine glasses 
of wine to Mr. Miller constitutes negligence per se. 
In determining whether to adopt a statutory standard of conduct as that of a 
reasonable person and impose a tort duty to act toward a person in accordance with that 
standard, Utah courts look to the guidelines contained in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
286. See, e.g., Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1163 (Utah 1991). Restatement § 286 
provides that: 
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the 
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation 
whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part 
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is 
invaded, and 
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and 
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, 
and 
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(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm 
results. 
One of the express purposes and policies of the State of Utah in enacting the 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, of which Section 32A-12-204 is a part, is to "conduct, 
license, and regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages in a manner and at prices that: . . . (b) 
will promote the reduction of the harmful effects of over consumption of alcoholic 
beverages by adults and consumption of alcoholic beverages by minors." Utah Code 
Ann. § 32A-l-104(4)(b). Considering this policy in light of the facts of this case, and 
applying the guidelines of Restatement § 286, it is clear that Section 32A-12-204 creates 
a minimum standard of care and imposes a duty upon Gastronomy to act toward its 
patrons, including Mr. Miller, in accordance with that standard. 
First, the enactment of Section 32A-12-204 was in part to protect the public from 
the "harmful effects of over consumption of alcoholic beverages by adults." See Utah 
Code Ann. § 32A-l-104(4)(b). Mr. Miller is an adult member of the public and thus, part 
of the class of persons that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act and Section 32A-12-204 
were enacted to protect. See Lyons v. Nasby, 770 P.2d 1250, 1258 (Colo. 1989) (because 
the purpose of Colorado's Liquor Code was to protect the public's safety, and since the 
Code did not single out patrons as being a class outside of the public, patrons were 
implicitly included within the protected class). Mr. Miller also sustained injuries as a 
result of having been unlawfully served alcohol by Gastronomy while intoxicated. 
Therefore, clauses (a) and (b) of the Restatement are satisfied. 
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Second, Section 32A-12-204 imposes criminal liability on an alcohol provider that 
serves a person who was apparently intoxicated, or who the alcohol provider knew or 
should have known was intoxicated. Again, this promotes the Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Act's purpose of reducing the harmful consequences of over consumption of 
alcohol by adults. Mr. Miller certainly suffered a harmful consequence which Section 
32A-12-204 is intended to guard against: Mr. Miller was served a continuous stream of 
alcohol by Gastronomy despite the fact that he was clearly intoxicated, thereby causing 
his death. As such, Section 32A-12-204 implicates clauses (c) and (d) of Restatement § 
286 as well. 
Further, Section 32A-12-204 embodies a rule that is so well-recognized and 
accepted by alcohol providers that it constitutes a legitimate source for establishing a 
standard of reasonable care. See Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 1999 UT 55, ^22-23, 
985 P.2d 892 (holding that OSHA standards are so widely known, understood, and 
followed, they constitute a legitimate source for the standard of reasonable care); Lyons, 
770 P.2d at 1258 (holding that an alcohol provider's violation of Colorado statute by 
serving alcohol to a consumer who was visibly intoxicated was conclusive evidence of 
negligence per se). 
Gastronomy failed to meet the minimum standard of care established by Section 
32A-12-204 when it continued to serve alcohol to Mr. Miller despite his intoxicated state, 
and therefore breached its duty to Mr. Miller. Gastronomy's violation of Section 32A-
12-204, therefore, is conclusive evidence of negligence per se and the district court erred 
in dismissing that claim. 
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B. Other Jurisdictions Recognize Common Law Claims Brought 
By Consumers Against Dramshops 
Numerous jurisdictions have recognized common law claims brought by 
consumers against dramshops that continued to serve the consumers after they were 
intoxicated, which resulted in injury. 
The Colorado Supreme Court case of Lyons v. Nasby, 770 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1989) 
is of particular relevance here. The facts in the Lyons case are nearly identical to those at 
issue in this case. Moreover, the court in Lyons provided a thorough and persuasive 
analysis to support its determination that not only does a dramshop owe a duty to its 
patrons to act reasonably in dispensing alcohol, but that a consumer of alcohol may bring 
a negligence action against a dramshop to recover for injury caused by the dramshop's 
unlawful sale of alcohol to the consumer when the consumer was visibly intoxicated. Id. 
at 1260. 
The consumer in Lyons was served alcohol by a tavern despite the fact that the 
consumer was visibly intoxicated. The consumer subsequently left the tavern and drove 
his automobile off a mountain road, suffering fatal injuries. The petitioner, the 
consumer's mother, brought an action against the tavern predicated upon common law 
theories of negligence and negligence per se, rather than a claim under Colorado's Dram 
Shop Act. The trial court granted the tavern's motion to dismiss, concluding that a tavern 
owner owes no duty to an intoxicated person. The appellate court affirmed. Id. at 1251-
52. 
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On appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, however, the Court reversed the court 
of appeals, concluding that prior to certain statutory amendments , 
a dispenser of alcohol was under a duty not to serve a visibly intoxicated 
person, that the dispenser's violation of this duty could be a proximate 
cause of the inebriate's injury, and that the inebriate or his estate could 
bring a claim against the dispenser for negligence. 
Id. at 1254 (emphasis added). 
In determining whether the law should impose a duty, the Lyons court considered 
several factors, including (1) the extent, foreseeability and likelihood of injury, (2) the 
social utility of the defendant's conduct, (3) the magnitude of the burden placed on the 
defendant to guard against injury, and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on the 
defendant. Id. Addressing the first factor, the court determined that the "lack of control, 
when coupled with the obvious possibility that the inebriate might attempt to drive an 
automobile, creates a foreseeable risk that the inebriate will suffer severe injury." Id.3 
The court also rejected the frequently raised argument that a tavern owner cannot foresee 
that an intoxicated person will attempt to drive as "untenable in light of the reality that 
travel by automobile is both 'commonplace and necessary in today's society.'" Id. 
Following precedent, the court stated that a tavern owner owes a duty to third 
persons to act with reasonable care in dispending alcoholic beverages to its patrons. 
2
 In 1985 and 1986, after the consumer's common law causes of action accrued in Lyons, the Colorado 
General Assembly enacted legislation that precludes a patron from suing a dramshop. Lyons, 770 P.2d at 1256 
(citing Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-46-112(1 )(b), 12-47-128(l)(a) (1985), and § 12-47-128.5(3)(b) (1988) Supp.)). The 
Utah Legislature, however, has not enacted any such legislation or amended the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act in 
such a way as to preclude a patron's common law claims against a dramshop, which were expressly recognized by 
the Utah Supreme Court as early as 1978 in Rees. The Utah Legislature has had over twenty years to enact 
legislation that would preclude or preempt patrons' common law claims against dramshops, but has chosen not to do 
so. 
3
 This was similarly recognized in Rees, where the Utah Supreme Court refused to foreclose the possibility 
that in selling alcohol to a minor, a jury may determine that it was reasonably foreseeable that the alcohol would be 
combined with an automobile and result in an accident. Rees, 587 P.2d at 133. 
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However, the court found absolutely no reason why this conclusion should not be 
extended to patrons as well as to third parties: "if the factors . .. indicate that a duty is 
owed, the status of the party as a consumer rather than a third party should not, as a 
matter of law, preclude the recognition of a duty," Id, (emphasis added). See also 
Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 756, 761 (D. Alaska 1973) (if a dramshop owes a 
duty to third persons and its conduct may be the proximate cause of injury to third 
persons, a fortiori the dramshop owes a duty to the customer himself, and the dramshop's 
conduct may be the proximate cause of injury to the customer). 
In support of its reasoning, the Lyons court did not dispute that voluntary 
intoxication is a self-indulgent act, and that a person who voluntarily consumes alcohol to 
the point of intoxication is at least partially responsible for his injuries. Id, at 1255. But 
the court rightfully refused to ignore the equally abhorrent actions of the tavern owner: 
[TJhefact that the patron has acted in an unacceptable manner should in 
no way lessen the equally unacceptable conduct of a tavern owner. One 
who stands behind a bar and serves drink after drink to a visibly 
intoxicated customer engages in behavior which is as opprobrious as that 
of the customer. We think it "morally indefensible" to condone the 
conduct of a tavern owner who, so long as the patron is able to pay, 
continues to serve the intoxicated patron a steady stream of alcohol. In 
our view the conduct of both the patron and the tavern owner is 
reprehensible and should be discouraged. Insulating tavern owners, as a 
matter of law, from liability does not send the message that they, as well 
as their patrons, must be accountable for their actions. 
Id, (emphasis added). Rather than insulate tavern owners from liability, the court in 
Lyons found that the appropriate mechanism for registering disapproval for the 
consumer's behavior was Colorado's comparative negligence statute, which requires the 
jury to assess the parties' relative degrees of fault when determining liability. Id, 
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The Lyons court similarly found that the remaining factors weighed in the favor of 
recognizing a duty owed by dramshops to their patrons. There is little or no social utility 
in providing an intoxicated person with more alcohol than he or she can safely consume. 
Id. at 1255. Further, the magnitude of the burden placed upon a dramshop to guard 
against injury to the patron is not so great as to bar the imposition of a duty. By imposing 
a duty, the court merely requires a dramshop to determine whether a patron who has 
requested a drink is visibly intoxicated, which is consistent with the Colorado statute 
criminalizing the act of selling alcohol to visibly intoxicated persons. Id. at 1255-56. 
The Supreme Court of Oregon in Fulmer v. Timber Inn Restaurant & Lounge, 
Inc., 9 P.3d 710 (Or. 2000), reached the same conclusion as the court in Lyons when 
faced with a similar situation. In Fulmer, a consumer brought common law claims 
against a dramshop to recover for injuries sustained by the consumer in a fall on the 
dramshop's premises after the dramshop served alcohol to the consumer while he was 
visibly intoxicated. Id. at 111. The court held that the consumer may bring a common 
law action for negligence and premises liability against a dramshop that negligently 
supplied alcohol to the consumer when the consumer was visibly intoxicated, and the 
consumer suffered injuries as a result. Id. at 718-19. 
Specifically, the court found that "[u]nder Oregon's comparative fault regime, a 
comparison of the relative fault of the defendant-alcohol server and plaintiff-alcohol 
consumer is a matter for the trier of fact to weigh in its apportionment of responsibility 
for plaintiffs injuries." Id. at 717. According to the court, a contrary holding - that a 
plaintiffs consumption of alcohol constitutes negligence that bars recovery against a 
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dramshop for injuries — would revive the concepts of contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk, both of which the Oregon legislature has specifically abolished in 
enacting the comparative fault statute. Id. Moreover, the court found that its holding 
would not relieve intoxicated patrons of their own responsibility to act reasonably 
because "a properly instructed jury may reduce significantly or negate any recovery 
[under the comparative fault statute] when the plaintiffs own unreasonable conduct has 
contributed to the plaintiffs injuries." Id. 
Other jurisdictions have similarly recognized a consumer's common law 
negligence claim against a dramshop. See, e.g., Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 
1961) (holding that a complaint charging a dramshop with serving alcohol to a patron 
who was noticeably intoxicated, and alleging that the patron was injured in an automobile 
accident as a result of his intoxication, stated a cause of action against the dramshop for 
negligence); Paula v. Gagnon, 146 Cal. Rptr. 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. Div. 3 1978) 
(concluding that neither a customer nor his heirs are prevented from recovering damages 
from a bartender for negligence on the ground that the serving of alcohol was not the 
proximate cause of the customer's injuries); O'Hanley v. Ninety-Nine, Inc., All N.E.2d 
1217 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (recognizing a consumer's negligence claim against a 
dramshop to recover for injuries sustained in falling off the bar as a result of the 
dramshop continuing to serve the consumer drinks after he had become intoxicated); 
Bisset v. DMl Inc., Ill P.2d 545 (Mont. 1986) (recognizing a consumer's claim against a 
dramshop for injuries caused by the dramshop's violation of the alcoholic beverage 
control statutes); Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 205 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1965) (recognizing a 
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consumer's negligence claim against a dramshop for injuries sustained by the consumer 
on the dramshop's premises after the dramshop served the customer with alcohol while 
he was intoxicated). 
While these jurisdictions admittedly follow the minority position, the reasoning 
contained in their case law is sound and equally applicable to this case. See, e.g., Horton, 
821 P.2d at 1168 ("[t]he contrary majority position does not allow an intoxicated person 
to recover from a provider of intoxicants"). Indeed, the fact that the Utah Supreme Court 
has expressly recognized that the sale of alcohol to a minor or to an intoxicated person 
should be considered in apportioning negligence {see Yost, 640 P.2d at 1046), separates 
Utah from those cases following the majority. 
The persuasive and sound analysis followed in those jurisdictions that recognize a 
common law cause of action for a consumer against a dramshop, coupled with the fact 
that Utah expressly allows for the consideration of a dramshop's improper conduct in 
selling alcohol to minors and intoxicated persons in apportioning fault and recognizes a 
common law cause of action by a consumer against a provider, supports the reversal of 
the district court's order dismissing the Millers' Complaint. 
C. The Millers' Claims Against Gastronomy Are Not Preempted by 
Utah's Dramshop Act. 
1. Utah's Dramshop Act Does Not Cover Common Law 
Claims Brought by First Party Consumers. 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that the Dramshop Act only preempts 
negligence claims resulting from acts for which the statute already imposes liability. 
Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, ^[13, 997 P.2d 305. By its express terms, the 
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Dramshop Act does not cover common law claims brought by first party consumers; 
therefore, such claims are not preempted. 
The Dramshop Act affords an innocent third party with a claim against a 
dramshop for damages the third party incurred as a result of the dramshop serving alcohol 
to a minor, a person who was apparently intoxicated, a person whom the dramshop knew 
or should have known was intoxicated, or a known interdicted person. Utah Code Ann. § 
32A-14a-102. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the legislative purpose of the 
Dramshop Act was to "compensate innocent third parties by making dramshop owners 
strictly liable without regard to the finding of faulty wrongful intenty or negligent 
conduct on their part" Adkins, 2000 UT 14, ^16 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court 
has recognized that the Dramshop Act was enacted to "fill the void" that existed at 
common law to provide third parties with a remedy against dramshops. Id. 
As is clear from its express terms, however, despite the district court's ruling 
below (Final Order, R. 75), the Dramshop Act does not cover claims brought by first 
party consumers who are injured as a result of dramshops serving them alcohol when 
they were intoxicated. See Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14a-101, et seq. Indeed, no Utah case 
has held that a common law claim brought by a first party consumer against a dramshop 
is preempted by the Dramshop Act.4 
4
 Rather, Utah courts have largely addressed claims brought by first party consumers under the Dramshop 
Act (not under common law), and claims brought by third parties under common law (not the Dramshop Act), 
finding in both scenarios that the plaintiff did not have a cause of action. We agree. As set forth above, the 
Dramshop Act was enacted specifically to provide innocent third parties with a remedy against dramshops for 
injuries suffered at the hands of an intoxicated person who was served by the dramshop. Such third party claims 
were not recognized at common law. To the contrary, however, first party claims were recognized at common law, 
as shown by Rees and Yost, and are not covered by the Act. 
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Further, despite the Court's opportunity on several occasions to overrule Rees and 
Yost — wherein the Court recognized a common law cause of action by a consumer 
against a dramshop prior to the enactment of the Dramshop Act — the Court has not 
overruled either case, nor has the Court questioned the foundation for their holdings. For 
example in Horton, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of a minor's 
common law claim under against an alcohol provider, as recognized in Rees and Yost, 
before the Dramshop was enacted. Horton, 821 P.2d at 1169. Even though the Court 
addressed the issue of preemption at length in Horton — correctly determining that the 
Utah legislature did not intend the Dramshop Act's scheme of strict liability to extend to 
first party consumer claims - the Court did not suggest that Rees or Yost had been 
overruled. See id. Indeed, the Court in Horton clearly stated that the common law claims 
of negligence against a provider of alcohol by a consumer of alcohol recognized in Rees 
and Yost were not "based on common law dramshop principles." Horton, 821 P.2d at 
1169. If a minor's common law claims survive preemption by the Dramshop Act, there 
is no reason why adult common law claims do not survive as well. 
2. Gilger Does Not Recognize the Preemption of the 
Millers' Common Law Claims. 
Relying upon Gastronomy's flawed arguments, the district court misconstrued the 
holding in Gilger in determining that the Millers' claims are preempted by the Dramshop 
Act. (See Supp. Mem., R. 22-23; Reply Mem., R. 40-42; Minute Entry, R. 71.) 
In Gilger, the defendant hosted a party at her residence, charging guests five 
dollars for all the beer they wanted to consume. During the course of the party, the 
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defendant served inebriated guests, including Martinez, who was a minor. Martinez 
threatened to injure other guests as the night went on, but nevertheless, the defendant 
continued to serve him beer. Martinez eventually stabbed and seriously wounded several 
guests at the party, including the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought suit against the 
defendant host, alleging common law negligence claims. The defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss, asserting that the plaintiffs claims were preempted by the Dramshop Act. 
G//ger, 2000 UT 23,112-3. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that "the common law of negligence is preempted 
insofar as it may impose liability for acts that the Dramshop Act reaches." Id. at 113. 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the plaintiffs' third party negligence claims based on the 
defendant's serving alcohol to a minor - which the Act was specifically enacted to 
address — were properly dismissed because such conduct was covered under the Act. Id. 
Contrary to the claims in Gilger, the Millers have asserted first party negligence 
claims on behalf of Mr. Miller — claims that are not covered by the Dramshop Act and 
not predicated on the Dramshop Act or "dramshop principles." See Horton, 821 P.2d at 
1169. As set forth at length above, the purpose of the Dramshop Act was to provide third 
parties with a cause of action against dramshops, which were not recognized at common 
law, to recover for injuries caused by intoxicated patrons of the dramshop. Adkins, 2000 
UT 14,116. Utah's Dramshop Act does not address first party claims, was not intended 
to cover first party claims, and therefore does not preempt any common law claim 
brought by a first party consumer against a dramshop. 
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CONCLUSION 
As set forth above, Utah common law recognizes the Millers' cause of action 
against Gastronomy, brought on behalf of Mr. Miller, to recover for injuries sustained as 
a result of Gastronomy's unlawful sale of alcohol to Mr. Miller when he was clearly 
intoxicated. The Dramshop Act does not preempt the Millers' common law claims 
because by its express terms, it only addresses claims brought by third parties. Indeed, it 
was enacted to "fill the void" in providing third parties a right of action against providers 
of alcohol where none existed at common law. As such, it has no bearing on the Millers' 
common law claims. 
Therefore, Allen and Beverly Miller respectfully request that this Court reverse the 
district court's Final Order granting Gastronomy's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED: August 27, 2004. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Natfian B.Wilcox U 
Heather M. Sneddon 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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1. Minute Entry, R. 71. 
2. Order Granting Motion for a Judgment on the Pleadings and the Dismissal ("Final 
Order"), R. 74-76. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLEN D. MILLER and BEVERLY B. : MINUTE ENTRY 
MILLER, on behalf of the Estate 
of Robert Miller, deceased, : CASE NO. 030913366 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. : 
GASTRONOMY, INC., a Utah : 
corporation, 
Defendant• 
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was taken 
under advisement by the Court after the submission of Memoranda, 
oral argument and supplemental Memoranda by counsel. After further 
review and consideration, the Court rules as follows. 
1. Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is 
granted in full as prayed for. This Court's ruling is based upon 
all of the legal analyses and legal authorities set forth in 
defendant's Memoranda in support, Reply and supplemental thereto, 
which is incorporated herein by this reference. 
2. Counsel for defendant is instructed to submit an Order 
consistent with this Minute Entry and Rule 7(F)(2), Utah Rules of 
MILLER V. GASTRONOMY PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
Civil Procedure. The Court would prefer, if possible, the Order 
submitted be approved as to form by opposing counsel. 
Dated this I day of Januaryy"2 004 
TYRONE/ E. MEDLEY 
DISTRJCT COURT JUDGE 
MILLER V. GASTRONOMY PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this / ' ^ a y of January, 
2004: 
Nathan B. Wilcox 
Heather M. Sneddon 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
50 W. Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert L. Stevens 
George T. Naegle 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 S. Main, 7th Floor 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
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ROBERT L. STEVENS [3105] 
GEORGE T. NAEGLE [5001] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Gastronomy, Inc. 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLEN D. MILLER and BEVERLY B. 




GASTRONOMY, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR A JUDGEMENT 
ON THE PLEADINGS 
AND THE DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 030913366 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
This matter came before the Court on December 22, 2003 upon defendant's 
Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings. Plaintiff and defendant were each represented by their 
attorneys of record. The Court having heard the arguments of counsel, having reviewed the 
briefs of the parties and having entered its Minute Entry on January 7, 2004, now enters its Order 
as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Judgement on the 
Pleadings is granted. Plaintiffs Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. This Order is 
By. 
/ - : : < 7 : 
^f&m^im 
u _ itiJ' CiQri* 
based upon the legal analysis and authorities presented by the defendant. The Court finds that 
plaintiffs' claim has been preempted by the Dram Shop statute Utah Code Ann. § 32(a)-14(a)-
102. The Court further finds that under the common law there can be no claim against a liquor 
provider for a person who, as a result of his voluntary intoxication, injures himself or causes his 
own death. 
DATED this n day of February, 2004. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
fofc 
NATHAN B.WIL(?OX 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
UJ^^ OL 
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY, 
Third Judicial District Court J 
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